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EDITORS

THE 2015 CHANGES TO THE FEDERAL
RULES MATTER FOR YOUR PATENT
CASE AND TECH BUSINESS: GETTING
IN THE COURTHOUSE DOOR JUST GOT
TOUGHER
By Matthew D’Amore
It used to be that a complaint for patent infringement
would survive a motion to dismiss if it included:
“1) an allegation of jurisdiction; 2) a statement that the
plaintiff owns the patent; 3) a statement that defendant
has been infringing the patent ‘by making, selling, and
using [the device] embodying the patent’; 4) a statement
that the plaintiff has given the defendant notice of its
infringement; and 5) a demand for an injunction and damages.” McZeal
v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007). So long
as you followed these elements set forth in Form 18 found in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, your complaint was likely to pass muster. See Id.;
K-Tech Telecomms, Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed.
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1026 (2014).
But the December 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure “abrogated” the forms in their entirety. What does that mean
for you? Read on.
Below, we’ll give a bit of history on how we got here, and then offer some
practical tips depending on which side of the “v” you’re on.
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Rule 84 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure introduced a series of
forms that became part of the rulebook. It provided that “[t]he forms in
the Appendix suffice[d] under these rules and illustrate[d] the simplicity
and brevity that these rules contemplate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (2007)
(emphasis added). Form 18 (previously Form 16) identified the short set
of five simple allegations for pleading patent infringement set out above.
See McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1356-57.
Of course, in 2007 and 2009, the Supreme Court set out new standards
for what a federal court complaint must contain. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). Under Iqbal:
continued on page 2
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To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing and quoting Twombly).
The Court also made clear that “[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
It would not be a stretch to call the allegations of Form
18 “threadbare,” as they fill all of four paragraphs. In a
trio of decisions between 2007 and 2013, however, the
Federal Circuit confirmed that it would continue to look
to the form for what sufficed to state a claim. See K-Tech,
714 F.3d at 1283 (“[A] proper use of a form contained in
the Appendix of Forms effectively immunizes a claimant
from attack regarding the sufficiency of the pleading…
[T]o the extent any conflict exists between Twombly
(and its progeny) and the Forms regarding pleadings
requirements, the Forms control.”); R+L Carriers, Inc. v.
DriverTech LLC (In re Bill of Lading Transmission and
Processing Sys. Patent Litig.), 681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“R+L Carriers”); McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1356-57.
Eliminating the form removes the foundation from these
decisions. The question then is whether they stand on
their own. Here’s what the Advisory Committee Notes say
about the deletion of Rule 84, which included the forms:
Rule 84 was adopted when the Civil Rules were
established in 1938 “to indicate, subject to the
provisions of these rules, the simplicity and brevity of
statement which the rules contemplate.” The purpose
of providing illustrations for the rules, although
useful when the rules were adopted, has been fulfilled.
Accordingly, recognizing that there are many excellent
alternative sources for forms, including the website of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
the websites of many district courts, and local law
libraries that contain many commercially published
forms, Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms are no
longer necessary and have been abrogated. The
abrogation of Rule 84 does not alter existing pleading
standards or otherwise change the requirements of
Civil Rule 8.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (Committee Notes on Rules – 2015
Amendment). Interestingly, the committee notes ignore
the part of the rule stating that the forms “suffice under
these rules,” on which the Federal Circuit had relied. As
a result, the notes give zero guidance to patent litigants
suddenly bereft of the safe harbor cited by the appellate
court.
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So, now what?

B. Tips for Getting in the Door and Staying
There
1. Signs that Point the Way
Judge Dyk’s partial dissent in McZeal provides one
interpretation of what Twombly and Iqbal might require
in patent cases. Seemingly prepared to tear up the
form based on Twombly, Judge Dyk argued that “[t]he
form fails to state which claims are asserted and which
features of the accused device are alleged to infringe the
limitations of those claims.” 501 F.3d at 1360 (Dyk, J.,
dissenting in part). And for a claim under the doctrine
of equivalents, Judge Dyk also argued that a complaint
would need to “specify which limitations are literally
infringed and which are infringed by equivalent [and], as
to the limitations alleged to be infringed by the doctrine
of equivalents, how the accused product is insubstantially
different from the patented devices.” Id.
R+L Carriers also provided guidance on what is needed
for a claim of contributory and induced infringement, and
this sheds light on direct infringement as well. According
to the Federal Circuit, “[t]o state a claim for contributory
infringement, therefore, a plaintiff must, among other
things, plead facts that allow an inference that the
components sold or offered for sale have no substantial
non-infringing uses.” 681 F.3d at 1337. The R+L
plaintiff, unfortunately, filed complaints that “actually
make clear on their face that [the accused] products do
have substantial non-infringing uses” and so pleaded itself
out of court on that count. Id. at 1339.
Similarly, for induced infringement, the Federal Circuit
held that “complaints must contain facts plausibly
showing that [the defendants] specifically intended their
customers to infringe the [] patent and knew that the
customer’s acts constituted infringement.” Id. As the
court observed:
This determination is, of course, case specific. In some
circumstances, failure to allege facts that plausibly
suggest a specific element or elements of a claim have
been practiced may be fatal in the context of a motion to
dismiss. Or, as with R + L’s contributory infringement
claims, facts may be pled affirmatively which defeat a
claim on its face. But, there is no requirement that the
facts alleged mimic the precise language used in a claim;
what is necessary is that facts, when considered in
their entirety and in context, lead to the common sense
conclusion that a patented method is being practiced.
Id. at 1342-43. These points equally apply to pleading
a claim of direct infringement without the benefit of the
form and suggest a flexible, fact-dependent approach.
continued on page 3

Furthermore, even before the change in the rules,
some courts required additional specificity for claims
of direct infringement. For example, a complaint for
patent infringement was dismissed in Macronix Int’l
Co. v. Spansion Inc., where (a) “the claims for literal
infringement d[id] not allege how the offending products
[infringe] the claims recited in the [complaint]”; (b) the
complaint “simply allege[d] that each element of a cited
claim is infringed and then parroted the claim language
for each element”; (c) the complaint “fail[ed] adequately
to allege infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
because [it] merely asserts liability under that doctrine in
a bare bones, conclusory form;” and (d) “it [was] not even
clear from the FAC what is alleged to be literally infringed
and what was alleged to be infringed by equivalents.” 4 F.
Supp. 3d 797, 804 (E.D. Va. 2014). The court noted that
“the showing need not be made in detail[,]... but must be
made.” Id. at 804 n.4.
2. The Form is Dead; Long Live the Form?
Despite Macronix, there’s an argument to be made that
notice pleading according to Form 18 still suffices. The
argument goes like this: Former Rule 84 stated that
the form “suffice[d]” under the rules, and the Advisory
Committee itself stated that removing the form did not
change what was and was not an acceptable pleading.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (2015 Advisory Committee Note) (“The
abrogation of Rule 84 does not alter existing pleading
standards or otherwise change the requirements of Civil
Rule 8.”). Prior to the abrogation of the form, a panel of
the Federal Circuit observed, without deciding, that it is at
least possible that “[a] complaint containing just enough
information to satisfy a governing form may well be
sufficient under Twombly and Iqbal.” K-Tech, 714 F.3d at
1284. Even the Supreme Court in Twombly noted that a
change to a “heightened” pleading standard beyond Rule
8 would require amendment to the Federal Rules. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14. In short, while the form
is gone, one could argue that it was merely exemplary of
what constitutes “a short, plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” (Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2)) and thus that the Federal Circuit jurisprudence
that accepted such statements remains good law.
At least one district court has adopted this approach,
finding a complaint sufficient where it contained the basic
allegations set out in K-Tech and McZeal:
Though Form 18 and Rule 84 were abrogated from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as of December
1, 2015, the Advisory Committee note associated with
this change directly states, “The abrogation of Rule 84
does not alter existing pleading standards or otherwise
change the requirements of Civil Rule 8.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 84 (2015 Advisory Committee Note). Thus, the
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Court refers to previously existing standards in ruling
upon the instant Motion.
Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evolution Corp., No.
2:14-0772-GMN-NJK, 2016 WL 199417, at *2 n.1
(D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2016); compare with Zoetis LLC v.
Roadrunner Pharmacy, Inc., No. CV 15-3193, 2016 WL
755622, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2016) (finding claims of
direct and indirect patent infringement failed to include
information required by Form 18 and R+L Carriers).
However appealing, this approach risks running afoul of
Judge Dyk’s partial dissent in McZeal and the suggestion
in R+L Carriers that Twombly and Iqbal must be
considered when the form is not available.
3. Pleading Plausibility
We don’t know yet exactly what degree of specificity the
Federal Circuit will require. We’ll be learning what not to
do as the case law evolves, but the cases provide at least
some suggestions for a complaint to have the best chance
of surviving a motion to dismiss:
•

Do your pre-filing investigation. Not only is it a
good idea, it’s the law.

•

Identify asserted claims. (It remains to be seen
whether phrasing like “at least claims 1, 5 and 7” or
“including but not limited to claims 1, 5 and 7” will
keep other claims in play.)

•

Identify accused products with as much specificity
as possible. If accusing a class of products, provide
some reason to infer that the class works in the
same way.

•

Provide a claim chart comparing the accused
device to the claim language, using facts rather
than conclusory assertions.

•

Specify limitations met by the doctrine of
equivalents, including facts supporting the claim of
insubstantial difference.

•

Plead specific facts supporting an inference of
induced, contributory or willful infringement.

This is obviously a tall order. Is it all necessary? What we
can say is that, just like the enormous growth in motions
to dismiss brought under Section 101 after Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) and Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), the death of the
form is sure to spark a growth in Rule 12(b)(6) motions
to challenge pleadings seemingly lacking in one way or
another. A detailed and well-pleaded complaint is the
surest way to overcome such a motion or avoid it in the
first place.

continued on page 4

C. Tips for Slamming the Door Shut (or Just
Leaving a Narrow Gap…)
If you’re on the other side of the “v,” considering a motion
to dismiss or a motion for a more definite statement (Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Rule 12(e)) should be one of the first
things on your list to consider. And even if you can’t
knock out the entire case, you may be able to take out part
of it. Here are some possible targets:
•

Look for conclusory assertions that component x
meets claim element y. Even if claim charts are
provided, conclusory recitations that just repeat
claim language should be viewed skeptically.

•

Watch for allegations against one product that are
generalized for other similar products. Are the
facts alleged sufficient to make that generalization
plausible?

•

Look for gross mismatches between the number
of claims identified or charted and the number of
claims in the patents. An allegation that “at least”
claim 1 is infringed may provide little notice for a
patent with sixty claims.

•

Get specific regarding indirect infringement.
Particularly for complaints that only allege indirect
infringement (for example, because the direct infringer
is a customer, mobile user, patient, or physician),
the additional elements needed for pleading indirect
infringement (e.g., knowledge, lack of substantial noninfringing uses) may be weak points.

•

Consider whether to target boilerplate claims of
willful infringement.

The cost-effectiveness of a motion to dismiss in the path
to a successful result of the case also should also be
considered. It may not matter that claims of contributory
infringement are eliminated at the pleading stage if
induced infringement will remain; it may be more costeffective to take both out at summary judgment later in
the case. Alternatively, a motion to dismiss or for a more
definite statement may be useful to narrow the case to
a certain set of claims or products if discovery can be
limited to what remains.
***
While the district courts may take varying approaches
based on the facts before them (compare Macronix
with Hologram USA) and Congress may add further
complexity (by passing legislation that imposes new
patent pleading standards), in the meantime the betting is
that pleading a patent case is more difficult than it used to
be and far more likely to be challenged.
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WILL THE SUPREME COURT
PUT THE BRAKES ON THE
IPR TREND? CUOZZO SPEED
TECH., LLC V. LEE
By Matthew Kreeger, Brian Matsui, and Seth Lloyd

Not so fast: the United States Supreme Court is set to review
the America Invents Act’s (“AIA”) fast-track inter partes review
(“IPR”) process. On January 15, 2016, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee,
No. 15-446, to address two questions: (1) whether the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) acted within its
rulemaking authority by adopting the rule that patent claims
be given their “broadest reasonable interpretation” during
IPR proceedings; and (2) whether a party may challenge, on
appeal to the Federal Circuit, any part of the PTO’s decision to
institute an IPR.
Whatever the Supreme Court decides, patent owners and
potential challengers alike should watch Cuozzo carefully.
Challenging a patent’s validity in IPRs has become a
mainstay whenever a party is sued for patent infringement
in district court. Defendants view IPRs as a cost-effective,
efficient alternative to often lengthy district court litigation,
even though the AIA’s estoppel provisions require accused
infringers to make certain invalidity challenges in only one
forum or the other. How the Supreme Court answers these
two questions could make IPRs less favorable to patent
challengers or more like district court litigation, either of
which may lead parties to rethink when it makes sense to
bring an IPR. The Court will hear argument on April 25,
2016, and should issue its decision before the Supreme
Court’s summer recess in late June/early July this year.

THE BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION
STANDARD
The first issue involves the PTO’s long-established practice of
construing claims in a patent or application according to their
“broadest reasonable interpretation” when determining the
claim’s patentability. The broadest reasonable interpretation
arguably produces broader constructions than the standard
federal courts apply when construing claims in litigation.
This difference has been justified in part because, during
PTO proceedings, a patent owner or applicant generally has
the opportunity to amend its claims to avoid a potentially
continued on page 5

